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Introduction
The process of monetary Integration in Europe has been accompanied by a discussion of the benefits and costs of abandoning national monetary autonomy. The effects of fixed exchange or füll monetary union on national monetary autonomy are discussed and it is tried to identify Optimum currency areas by weighting benefits in form of reduced transaction costs and increased credibility of monetary authorities against the costs of reduced, or lost, monetary autonomy for national stabilization purposes (see Tavlas, 1993 , for a summary of the discussion). This framework however is inadequate to address national distributional consequences of European Monetary Union (EMU) because it does not distinguish between different national sectors of the economy (see Bofinger, 1994 , for a similar critique). When taking different national sectors in an economy into account, distributional issues and conflicts arise. 1
This paper derives distributional effects of monetary union by focusing on the effects of changes in banking policy which necessarily accompany monetary and financial integration.
While monetary policy is the action taken by a central bank to achieve objectives in terms of price level, employment and interests rates, banking policy focuses on actions vis-ä-vis commercial banks or other financial institutions, together with financial regulation and banking supervision (see Giovannini, 1993a) . Building on this distinction, the paper explores the role and interests of large commercial banks in the process of monetary integration. Starting out with the common market project, we show that large commercial banks are not only interested in füll financial integration but also gain from a Single currency and unification of banking regulation. While the first point is rather obvious and has been frequently observed in the literature (see e.g. Cohen, 1989) , the second seems at first glance rather paradoxical because banks profit from currency transactions. Giovannini (1993b) hence views the transactions costs savings through monetary union as a distribution of resources between the financial and 1 Only veiy little literature has tried to identify distributional interests in connection with monetary regimes. Frieden (1991) and Epstein (1991) derive conflicts between factors of production, namely labor and capital, while Ruland and Viaene (1993) derive sectoral interests (importing and exporting sector). Vaubel (1990) analyzes the position of central banks with regard to EMU. Giovannini (1993b) and Eichengreen and Frieden (1993) give an overview of different approaches to identify interest groups and to endogenize the choice of exchange rate regimes.
nonfinancial sector. In Giovannini's estimation these amount to 4 to 5 percent of total vaiue added in the EU financial sector and he consequently identifies M a significant transfer of resources across two clearly identifiable interest groups: from international banks to their clients involved in cross-border transactions within Europe" (Giovannim, 1993b, 16) . This Statement, however, is not only in contrast to public wisdom, which broadly views the common market and monetary integration project as driven by the large industry and business leaders who try to exploit economies of scale (Casella, 1992) in general, but is also in contrast to explicit statements by major European banks (see Frieden, 1991; Lipp et al., 1992; and Weber, 1993 ).
We offer a Solution to this seeming paradox between the fact that, on the one hand, everybody assumes the financial industry and major banks to be behind the European integration process and, on the other hand, that the banking industry loses profits when a common currency is introduced. While banks clearly lose some profits in form of the margins they take when Converting currencies, we are able to identify much 1 arger gains arising from monetary union implying common regulation of the European banking industry through a common central bank and, specifically, increased Cooperation among large European banks.
The resulting effects for banks, however, are not at all unambiguous. It turns out that only the large banks will gain from Cooperation across borders because of their larger national market share for international transactions. There is hence a conflict between large and small banks in their position concerning EMU. Only large banks can afford the costs arising from
Cooperation across borders because of their size. Therefore difFerences in size and reduction in variable costs by Cooperation determine the position of a particular bank with regard to EMU.
Even a uniform reduction of transaction costs for cooperating and noncooperating banks due to the fact that exchange transactions are no longer necessary affects market structure and thus large bank's profits.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 gives a broad overview of the structure of the market for banking Services in major European countries, the cross-border Cooperation among
European banks, and the position of banks concerning EMU. Section 3 lays out our argumentation in füll and develops a model to highlight the effects of monetary union on European banks. Section 4 concludes.
Financial Liberalization and the European Banking Market
When taking a first look at the banking market in major European countries, the most striking impression is the high degree of concentration (see Table 1 ). While a small number of larger banks generally has an almost dominant market share, the rest is divided among a much larger number of small banks. Therefore, it seems important to take this dichotomy into account when analysing the European banking market and the actions taken by banks and their
Position vis-ä-vis monetary union and financial liberalization.
Insert Table 1 The second feature of the European banking market is the process of liberalization in financial services. In 1985 the member countries of the EC adopted the Single European Act, aiming for a completion of the "Common Market" in 1992. In late 1986, this was followed by a formal agreement to remove controls on a wide variety of capital movements within the (Canals, 1993) .
The efFect of such deregulation and liberalization is necessarily a higher degree of competition among banks, or this one would at least suppose. The reaction of banks naturally is action to prevent too much competition. They react to the increase in competition by trying to reduce their rivalry via mergers, acquisitions and cross-participation agreements (see Table   2 ). 2 The obvious reason for doing so is that collusion is easier to sustain with fewer rivals and that margins are larger under Cooperation. Another reason is, of course, the realization of economies-of-scale and -scope (Vinals, 1991) . An increase in the number of branches gives rise to network externalities because for the consumer this is an important consideration when choosing her financial institution. This also constitutes an important barrier to entry because it gives rise to economies-of-scale.
Insert Table 2 Against this The first rough impression is that those who suffer most from currency volatility stand to gain the most from monetary union. These include major banks and corporations with pan-EC investment or trade interests (Eichengreen and Frieden, 1993) . On the other hand, the European Community (1990) has carried out an assessment of the magnitude of transaction costs incurred by European countries because of the existence of various currencies. They estimate ECU 6.2 to 10.4 billion (June 1990) for turnover in the foreign exchange market multiplied by bid-ask spreads in the foreign exchange markets, netting out transactions in the interbank market and transactions involving nonmember currencies. Adding costs in the retail foreign exchange market and the costs of cross-border payments, treasury measurement in companies running separate wholesale payments systems across Europe adds to a total cost for the EU between 13.1 and 19.2 billion ECU. The costs amount to 4 to 5 percent of the total value added in the EU financial sector, where the largest part of it goes through London. Since a large part constitutes a transfer of resources between the financial and the nonfinancial sectors, Giovannini (1993b) concludes that the creation of a single currency represents a significant redistribution of resources between two clearly identifiable interest groups. Based on the so-called transaction costs model, he predicts that international banks should resist the adoption of a Single currency, in order to avoid the costs of adjusting to a new business environment, while firms which are involved in cross-border trade within the EU should favor it. One possible reason why large banks nevertheless lobby for monetary union is that monetary union can be seen as a commitment to the common market and financial liberalization. Without monetary union, given fixed exchange rates, there is an obvious danger that govemments resort to capital controls to defend the exchange rate band (Eichengreen 1993) . In this perspective, monetary union is the logical and only permissible Solution to secure the common market for capital and services. It is thus an integral part of the common market and as such in the interest of all large firms and banks.
We offer an alternative Solution to the above puzzle by explicitly taking into account the structure of the banking market in Europe. The high degree of concentration gives rise to a cleavage between large and small banks because the competition for market shares is one reason why large banks prefer a Single European market. Monetary integration, moreover, and the implied common regulation of the banking business, reduce variable costs for cross-border transactions. The following section analyzes the effects of a cost reduction on market structure and profits in the concentrated oligopolistic market for transborder financial services.
Bank Size. Bank Cooperation and the Effects of EMU
A. The National Banking Market
In this section we develop a simple model of the oligopolistic market for cross-border banking services in Europe. We restrict our attention only to transactions which involve crossborder capital movements and abstract from the domestic market, that is transactions between regions within one country. We assume an imperfect competition framework, where only two banks, a large bank (indexed i) and a small bank (indexed j), compete in a Cournot fashion.
Moreover, we only model the domestic market, that is we only look at the choices domestic 
with Cj =v N s; frequent meetings build trust among business partners and might also lead to faster and less costly dealings.
The price charged for cross-border financial services is defined via a Standard inverse demand function
where a can be interpreted as the size of the domestic market for international banking services. We assume that national demand is always addressed to domestic banks, whether they cooperate internationally or not. X = xt + x} is the total amount of financial services supplied by all banks, and Xj being the supply of the large and the small bank respectively. A cooperating bank is assumed to obtain the gains arising from its domestic business. We thus abstract from issues of negotiations and distribution of aggregated profits in different countries among cooperating banks.
The Cournot equilibrium of the game, given marginal costs, is described by the quantities
The national equilibrium is given by the following total supply (the sum of xj and xj)
where the market Clearing price of services is given by P=r 3 a *3^* C^'
Profits for the individual bank are therefore given by and *1 =^(a * c i ~2 c i) 2 ~^F 7Cj =^( a^c i-2c j) 2 -^j F < 6 ') S respectively. It is obvious from equation 6 that the fixed costs F influence both banks similarly, while the relative and absolute size of a bank has an important influence on the equilibrium decision.
B. The Effects of the Single Market
With these preliminaries at hand, we are now able to analyze the effects of different institutional arrangements on the market structure and on each bank's profits. The single market and economic integration are usually expected to expand the cross-border trade in
Europe. According to the famous Cecchini-report, increased intra-industrial trade and economies-of-scale should contribute to a larger volume of trade, accompanied by increased direct Investment and portfolio investment (see also European Commission, 1990 and Baldwin, 1991) . Increased cross-border transactions will, of course, also entail expanded business for banks because transborder payments increase. This corresponds to an increase of the parameter a in our model. Effects on variable costs v N are, however, unlikely to appear.
C. The Effects of Monetary Union and Common Banking Policv
Since it is clear that a monetary union must comprise a common and single central bank, the nature of the banking business is transformed. A single central bank must necessarily unify regulations and supervision for the whole of its territory (Giovannini, 1993a) . Under the Second Banking Directive, which follows the principle of mutual recognition, no substitution of national regulation is required unless necessary. While home-countries are in Charge of supervision, host countries' authorities are in Charge of liquidity ratios. However, the EU member countries are supposed to make necessary changes in their national laws to conform to the EC directives. Therefore, be it either because of the harmonized rules of the single-market directives, or as a result of competitive deregulation due to the freedom of establishment in the banking industiy, bank regulations will become approximately homogeneous across member countries. To the extent that activities of financial firms go beyond their national borders, there is a clear reason to encourage tight Cooperation among national authorities. Because the linkage of national payments systems will inevitably give rise to arbitrage-induced payments-routing, we expect the substitution of national systems with a new, EU-wide wholesale payments system managed by the common central bank. Thus, problems of payments systems suggest a negative answer to the question whether the presence of a variety of financial systems and institutions is compatible with a Single currency (Giovannini, 1993a) .
Given this requirement of common regulation, it is here that we expect a uniform reduction in the variable costs of cross-border transactions, expressed as a reduction of v N in our model. Not only is there certainly a reduction in the fixed costs from adapting to different regulations in different countries, but accounting procedures will be unified as well.
Furthermore, exchange transactions are no longer necessary.
D. The Conditions
We are now in the position to derive explicit propositions about when we will see international Cooperation among large banks and no Cooperation among small banks. This will enable us to explain the stylized facts of section 2, and establish the interests of large banks in monetaiy union.
In our first proposition we State that there are marginal-cost structures that will lead to asymmetric international Cooperation. In the second proposition we derive the conditions for Symmetrie equilibria where both the large and the small bank do or do not cooperate. Both conditions enable us to explain why decreasing marginal costs for both the cooperating and the noncooperating bank can induce a change in the market structure.
Proposition 1
For all positive a, b, v N , F s; and Sj with s;> sj5 there is a nonempty interval of cost differentials A v, so that, for these parameter values, the following strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE):
(i) The large player chooses to cooperate internationally.
(ii) The small player does not cooperate. 
(8')
Conditions (7') and (8') are represented graphically in Figure 1 . We call Avx the infimum of the positive part of the Solution set of (7') and Avn the supremum of the Solution set of (8'). Both players do not cooperate internationally.
For this upper bound we have Av*=AvI.
(ii) For all sb Sj, F, b and v N , there is a minimal Av+>0 so that for all Av>Av+>0 the following strategy profile is a SPNE:
Both players cooperate internationally.
For this lower bound we have Av+=Avn.
(i) Conditions for a noncooperative Nash-equilibrium are easily derived. The proof is analogue to Proposition 1. (7% the condition for the Cooperation of the large bank, changes the sign:
The condition for the noncooperation of the small bank is obtained by exchanging indices Proof 2
The Solution set corresponds to the values of Av, where in Figure 2 the parabola is below hj.
The supremum of the intersection of both Solution sets, A, is Avj.
( 
Conchision
This paper explains why large banks favor European monetary union although high mark-ups on international financial transactions will be reduced. Our Solution to this puzzle is based on the Observation that the market structure for bank transactions is currently dominated by a number of large national banks which compete with smaller regional ones. Assuming that monetary union will change the variable costs for both cooperating and noncooperating banks, we argued that this effect could bring together the critical mass necessary to induce changes in the market structure so that the demand for international transactions will almost exclusively be served by the large cooperating banks. There are at least two reasons to assume lower variable costs with monetary union: one is the fact that transaction costs for exchange Operations vanish. The second point is that the unification of bank regulation laws will reduce the marginal costs for cross-border transactions again. Our model, thus, predicts a deepening of existing international cooperations of large banks and a dramatic change in the market structure for international transactions occurring with monetary union. 
